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Abstract
ABE has been widely applied for secure data protection in cloud computing. In ABE, user’s private keys are
generated by attribute authority, thus, attribute authority has the ultimate privileges in the system and can
impersonate any users to forge valid signatures. Once the attribute authority become dishonest or be invaded in
cloud systems, the system’s security will be at risk. To better solve the problem mentioned above, in this paper, we
propose a key-policy attribute based signature scheme with untrusted authority and traceability (KP-ABS-UT). In our
scheme, the signer’s private key is composed by two components: one part is distributed by attribute authority and
the other part is chosen privately by the signer’s self. Thus attribute authority cannot forge any signatures which
should be signed by legal users. Besides, our scheme introduces an entity “tracer”, which can trace the identity of
signer when necessary. By security analysis and efficiency comparison, we prove our KP-ABS-UT scheme meets the
requirements of unforgeability as well as lower computation cost.
Keywords: Access structure, Untrusted authority, Traceability
Introduction
With the various information resources increasing rap-
idly in the cloud, users are faced with urgent problems
like how to make data sharing among resources effi-
ciently and securely. On this occasion, Sahai proposed a
new cryptographic primitive named “ABE” (attribute
based encryption) [1]. In ABE mechanism [1–4], a user’s
identity is described by several attributes rather than a
single string. A data receiver is capable of getting access
to the data when the attributes he possesses match with
the structure made by the data owner. KP-ABE [2, 3] is
a typical class of ABE.As is shown in Fig. 1, a user’s pri-
vate key corresponds to an access tree structure. Each
leaf node stands for the attribute a user owns; the non-
leaf node describes the access policy of these attributes.
The ciphertext corresponds to an attribute set such as
{Attr1, Attr4}. Due to its capability of providing flexible
access control for data sharing between users, KP-ABE
is gradually becoming an effective tool for secure data
sharing in complex networks.
After the proposal of ABE, ABS (attribute based signa-
ture) has been developed as a primitive to solve the data
authentication problem in attribute based cryptosystem.
ABS was originally proposed by Maji et al. in [5]. In ABS
mechanism [6–9], a user is capable of signing a message
using the private key component of the attribute set he
owns. A receiver validates the signature by utilizing sys-
tem public parameters. The signature can be verified to
an attribute set or access structure which the signer pos-
sesses. Since the advent of the notion, many ABS
schemes have been proposed. However, most of the
existing ABS schemes have one thing in common, that is
the attribute authority has the ultimate privileges in the
whole system. In order to keep the whole system run-
ning safely, attribute authority must be honest and
highly protected. In the open network systems, attribute
authority are vulnerable to external as well as internal
threat. Once being invaded, it can impersonate any users
to forge legal signatures, which will threaten the whole
security of the system. What’s more, anonymity is an
important feature of common attribute based signature
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mechanism. However, some malicious users may take
advantage of this feature to release illegal information
without taking responsibility.
To better solve the problems discussed above, in this
paper, we construct a KP-ABS-UT (key-policy attribute
based signature with untrusted authority and traceabil-
ity) scheme, which has the following merits: (1) the sig-
nature is unforgeable, even attribute authority cannot
impersonate any users to forge legal signatures; (2) the
overall computation cost of the whole process of signing
and verifying is reduced sharply; (3) the signer’s identity
can be traced by the system administer if necessary.
The rest sections are arranged as follows:
In section 2, we give the literature review and funda-
mental mathematical preliminaries and notions. The se-
curity model and detailed algorithms of our KP-ABS-UT
scheme are constructed in section 3 and section 4. Section
5 gives the security proof and performance comparison of
our scheme. At last, the conclusion of this paper and pros-
pects on future directions are made in section 6.
Related works and preliminaries
Related works
The notion of ABS was first proposed by Maji in [5].
Since then, many ABS schemes have been proposed by
researchers worldwide. Existing literatures of ABS can
be classified to three types in terms of the data access
structure :(1)ABS using threshold structure [10–12]; (2)
ABS using LSSS access structure [13–15];(3) ABS using
access tree [16], which has been illustrated in Fig. 1. Be-
sides access structure, different ABS schemes have dif-
ferent advantages and performances. A. Escala et al. in
[13] proposed a user-revocable attribute based signature.
If a user drops some of the attributes, his signing privil-
ege can be exactly withdrawn. Their scheme also
achieves adaptively security in the standard model. S.
Shahandashti et al. in [10] construct a threshold ABS
and applied it to credential systems. Their scheme
enables a signature holder to prove possession of signa-
tures by revealing only the relevant attributes of the
signer, hence providing signer attribute privacy for the
signature holder. S. Kumar et.al in [11] proposed an
ABS which is equipped with multiple threshold access
structure. Their scheme is efficient as well as stretch-
able. Tatsuaki et al. in [16] proposed a decentralized
multi-authority ABS. In their scheme, due to the introdu-
cing of multiple authorities, thus no central CA is needed.
However, this also brings about other problems such as
parameter synchronization, time synchronization, etc. Be-
sides, the efficiency of their scheme can be further im-
proved. S.L Ding et al. proposed a traceable ABS in [14],
which allows PKG and the issuing authority join together
to trace the identity of a malicious signer. However, since
the trace algorithm needs frequent participation of PKG,
it may be exposed to more internal and external security
risks. Li et al. in [15] proposed a novel ABS with hidden
attribute property. In their scheme, anonymous user revo-
cation is achieved. Liu et al. in [17] proposed an attribute
based multisignature scheme, which allows a number of
users to participate to authenticate a message with only
one signature. Their scheme is shown to be secure and is
more appropriate to be applied for wireless communica-
tions. Chen et al. in [9] proposed a new paradigm named
“Outsourced ABS”. The computation load in their scheme
is reduced sharply by delegating most of the computation
work to a semi-trusted server, thus this will relieve the ter-
minal devices from heavy computation burden. The high
efficiency and security level makes their scheme an excel-
lent method for providing data authentication in cloud
computing. Xu et al. in [18] propose an ABS scheme with
dynamic user revocation. Their scheme has superior per-
formance with regard to scalability, which is able to be
applied to massive data storage environments.
The above schemes have laid solid foundations for filling
the gap between theoretical proposal and practical appli-
cation of ABS. However, in the above schemes, the attri-
bute authority has the ultimate privilege in the system.
Even worse, it can forge as any legal users and generates a
valid signature. Once the attribute authority become dis-
honest, the system will be exposed to potential risks.
Although ABS with multiple attribute authorities has been
proposed in [16], if these attribute authorities collude with
each other to obtain a user’s private key, a legal signature
can still be successfully forged. Thus, it is of significance
to cut down the privilege of the attribute authority in ABS
systems.
Bilinear pairings
Denote G1 and G2 to be cyclic groups of prime order q.
Let g be a generator of G1. A bilinear pairing ê :G1 ×
G1→G2 has three features [19]:
Fig. 1 Access structure for KP-ABE
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Bilinearity: For a, b∈ Zq, ê(g
a, gb) = ê(g, g)ab.
Non-degeneracy: There exists P,Q∈G1 which satisfy
ê(g, g) ≠ 1.
Computability: The value of ê(u, v) can be calculated
for any u, v∈G1.
Hardness assumption
Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem:
Picks random numbers a; b; c; z∈Zq , assuming that the
value of (g, ga, gb, gc, z) are given, no probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm can distinguish the tuples (A =
ga, B = gb,C = gc, ê(g, g)abc) and (A = ga, B = gb,C = gc, ê(g,
g)z) with a non-negligible probability.
Lagrange Interpolation function
For a polynomial p(x) in Zq of order d − 1 and a set S in








Our model and assumptions
Formal model of our scheme
In order to clearly describe our KP-ABS-UT, we define
some notations listed in Table 1.
The model of our system is shown in Fig. 2. Our
model consists of 4 entities: “AA” (Attribute authority),
“tracer”, “signer” and “receiver”. AA provides system’s
public parameters, generates part of user’s private key
and distributes them to users. After receiving the
original key generated by AA, signer re-generates his
own private key by adding a secret component. Then
signer signs the plaintext using the private key generated
by himself and uploads the signature to cloud center.
Cloud center provides secure data storage and responses
the access request made by data receiver. Receiver veri-
fies if the signature is a valid one. Tracer is responsible
for revealing the signer’s identity when necessary.
Formulized definitions of algorithms in KP-ABS-UT:
Setup{1λ}→ {PK,MK}:This algorithm is operated by
AA. Take in a security parameter, it generates PK and
MK. PK is shared by users while MK is kept private by
AA.
Private key generation PK ;MK ;Tk ; sf g→ Di;Tk ;idl
 
: The
private key generation algorithm is an interaction
between AA and a user with an access structure Tk. On
input PK, MK, Tk, AA firstly returns Di;Tk to be the
initial attribute private key for Tk. Then each signer
embeds a secret component into Di;Tk to re-generate his
own private key Di;Tk ;idl .Signer sends certain information
referring to the secret component to tracer. Tracer
assigns a unique identity number to the signer and stores
the relationship of each signer with his identity.
Sign Di;Tk ;idl ; PK ;M; σ idl
 
→ vf g: This algorithm is run
by a signer which the systems public parameter PK, a
plaintext M, signer’s private key Di;Tk ;idl and a
mathematical constant σ idl which can reveal signer’s
identity as input. Then the algorithm outputs a
signature v for the plaintext M.
Verify{PK, v,M}→ {θ}: This algorithm is run by the
receiver. On input PK and the plaintext M with the
signature, it outputs a value θ. If θ = 1 then the
signature is a valid one, if θ = 0 then the signature is
invalid.
Trace{MK, v}→ {idl}: This algorithm is run by the
tracer. On input the signature v,the tracer can pinpoint
the exact identity of a signer.
The essential unforgeability of our KP-ABS-UT
Definition 1
Our KP-ABS-UT has the existential unforgeability if no
Adversary has non-negligible advantage in the following
game played by a Challenger and an Adversary.
Setup :Challenger runs Setup procedure to obtain the
system parameters and sends PK to Adversary.
Sign queries : Adversary chooses an access control
structure Ti,a plaintext M. Challenger calculates the at-
tribute private key Di;Tk ;idl and runs the Sign procedure
to calculate the signature v ¼ Sign PK ;M;Di;Tk ;idl
 
.After
then, Challenger sends the signature v to Adversary.
Challenge : Adversary chooses a plaintext M*,a challen-
ging access structure Tc , and calculates the signature v*.
Table 1 Notations and their corresponding meanings
Notations Meanings
G1, G2 Groups
ê Bilinear paring operation
H1 Hash function
PK System public parameters
MK System master key
AA Attribute authority
U Global attribute set
Ai Attribute i
Di Private key of attribute i
M Plaintext
Ti Access structure
x Node in the access tree
Δi,S(x) Lagrange interpolation function
qx Polynomial defined by AA
px Polynomial defined by signer
v Signature to be verified
idl Identity of user l
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Challenger verifies the signature by running the pro-
cedure Verify(PK, v*) and outputs a value θ.
Adversary wins if the output of Verify algorithm is
valid.
Denote Adv(A) = |Pr[θ = 1]| to be advantage of
Adversary.
Our construction to KP-ABS-UT scheme
Concrete algorithms:
Setup: Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of prime
order p, while g is the generator of G1. Let ê :G1 ×G1→
G2 be a bilinear paring. Define H1 : {0, 1}*→ Zp.AA picks
ti∈Zp for each Ai in the system. Besides, AA picks an-
other secret number y∈Zp and calculates ê(g, g)
y.Set MK
to be {ti, y} while PK to be G1;G2 ; p; g;H1; e^ g; gð Þy; gtif g.
Private key generation: AA randomly chooses a poly-
nomial qx for each node x in the access tree and sets the
degree dx of qx to be one less than the threshold value kx
of that node (dx = kx − 1). For any other node (except
root node) in the access tree, let qx(0) = qparent(x)
index(x) . For the
root node AA sets qroot(0) = y. To avoid the signature
forgery which can be made by AA, the signer also
chooses a polynomial px likewise and picks a secret
number s. For the root node AA sets qroot(0) = y while
the signer sets proot(0) = s. Once the polynomials have
been decided, the private key is of each leaf node x in
the access tree can be denoted by Di;Tk ;idl ¼
g
qx 0ð Þ:px 0ð Þ
ti ; i∈Tk
n o
. Signer sends the value of gs to tracer.
For each signer, tracer chooses a global unique identifier
idl∈Zp to describe his identity (Without loss of general-
ity, the signer’s identity is denoted by idl). Tracer calcu-
lates σ idl ¼ gsð Þidl and sends σ idl back to the signer.
Meanwhile, it stores a list recording the relationship be-
tween singer’s unique identifier and σ idl .
Sign: For a plaintext M, the signer picks a random
number r∈Zp and calculates:
C0 ¼ e^ g; gð Þyrs;C1 ¼ e^ g; gð Þys















The signature can be denoted by v ¼
C1;C2;C3;M; σ idl ; g
s;H1 Mjjσ idlð Þsf g. The signer sends v
to the receiver.
Verify: After receiving the signature v = {C1,C2,C3,M,
σid, g
s,H1(M||σid)
s} from the signer, receiver firstly calcu-
lates: ê(H1(M||σid)
s, g) = ê(H1(M||σid), g
s).
If the equation is set up, then calculates VerityNode
x;PK ; vð Þ ¼ e^ gti ;C2ð Þ.
If x is a leaf node, then the calculation process is as
follows:
Fig. 2 The system model of KP-ABS-UT in cloud computing
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VerityNode x;PK ; vð Þ
¼
e^ gti ;C2ð Þ ¼ e^ gti ; g






H1 Mjjσ idlð Þsþr0BB@
1
CCA
¼ e^ gti ; g






H1 Mjjσ idlð Þsþr





All the value calculated from VerityNode(x, PK, v) will
be stored as Fz. For any Fz ≠ 0, the algorithm calculates
Froot (the value of root node) using Lagrange
interpolation method.
If x is a non-leaf node, z is the child node of x,then the
value of VerityNode(x, PK, v) is calculated as follows:
Let i = index(z), Sx









e^ gpz 0ð Þ







index zð Þð Þ Δi;Sx0 0ð Þ
;
gqparent zð Þ
index zð Þð Þ Δi;Sx0 0ð Þ
 	




e^ gpx ið Þ
 Δi;Sx0 0ð Þ ; gqx ið Þ Δi;sx0 0ð Þ  H1 Mjjσ idlð Þsþr
¼ e^ gpx 0ð Þ; gqx 0ð Þ H1 Mjjσ idlð Þs ⋅e^ gr:px 0ð Þ; gqx 0ð Þ 
ð3Þ
Then, the algorithm calculates Froot (the value of root
node) by recursive function.
Finally, the algorithm verifies if:
Froot ¼ C1H1 Mjjσ idlð Þ
s
⋅C0 ð4Þ
If the equation is set up, then the signature is a legal
one and the signer’s attributes satisfies the claimed
structure.
Trace: The tracer searches the list recording the rela-
tionship between idl−σ idl , then the identity of the signer
can be pinpointed.
Security proof and performance evaluation
Correctness proof
To calculate the value of Froot, it is essential to obtain
the value of leaf nodes which satisfy the access structure.
Since the value of VerityNode x;PK ; vð Þ ¼ e^
gpx 0ð Þ; gqx 0ð Þ
 H1 Mjjσ idlð Þsþr; whether x is a leaf node or
non-leaf node, consequently, the value of root node Froot
can be calculated by:
Froot ¼ e^ gproot 0ð Þ; gqroot 0ð Þ
 H1 Mjjσ idlð Þsþr
proot 0ð Þ ¼ s; qroot 0ð Þ ¼ y
ð5Þ
Consequently, if the signature is valid then the equation
is set up:
Froot ¼ e^ gs; gyð ÞH1 Mjjσ idlð Þ
sþr
¼ e^ g; gð Þysð ÞH1 Mjjσ idlð Þ
sþr





If our scheme can be broken by an Adversary then it can
be constructed that a simulator with a non- negligible
advantage solves the DBDH problem successfully.
Proof
In the challenge game, if an Adversary can break our
scheme with advantage ε, then a simulator be constructed
to solve the DBDH problem with an advantage of ε2.
The construction process of the simulator is as
follows:
Phase 1 Setup:
Challenger sets the parameters as follows:
Defines a global attribute set U = {1, 2,… n}.
Denotes idl to be the unique identifier of Adversary.
Defines G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of prime order
p. The generator of G1 is denoted by g.
Defines a bilinear paring ê :G1 ×G1→G2.
Picks μ ∈ {0, 1}, a, b, c, z ∈ Zp.
A;B;C;Zð Þ ¼ ga;gb;gc;e^ g;gð Þabc
 
if μ ¼ 0
A;B;C;Zð Þ ¼ ga;gb;gc;e^ g;gð Þz  if μ ¼ 1
(
ðLetÞ
The aim of simulator is to output a value μ* as a guess
of μ.
The simulator runs Adversary as sub-program and
plays the role of Challenger.
Adversary defines attribute set γ.
Simulator randomly chooses ri, βi ∈ Zp and sets PK to
be Y ¼ e^ ga; gb  ¼ e^ g; gð Þab;Ti ¼ gri ; if i∈γgbβi ; if i∉γ


Phase 2 Queries :
Private key generation queries:When Adversary asks a
Private key generation query for access structure Tk,
simulator responds as follows:
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Chooses two polynomial qx, px for each node x in the ac-
cess structure Tk and sets the degree dx of qx, px to be one
less than the threshold value kx of that node (dx = kx − 1).
Besides, simulator sets qroot(0) = y, proot(0) = s. For any
other node (except root node) in the access tree, let
qx(0) = qparent(x)
index(x) . Then simulator calculates the private
key and sends Di;Tk ;idl back to Adversary.The format
of Di;Tk ;idl is as follows:
Di;Tk ;idl ¼
g
qx 0ð Þpx 0ð Þ
ti ¼ g
qx 0ð Þpx 0ð Þ
ri ; if att xð Þ∈γ
g
qx 0ð Þpx 0ð Þ
ti ¼ g
qx 0ð Þpx 0ð Þ
bβi ; if att xð Þ∉γ
8>><
>>:
Sign queries: When Adversary asks a Sign query for ac-
cess structure Tk and a plaintext M, simulator responds
as follows:
Firstly, simulator calculates the private key Di;Tk ;σ idl .
Obtaining the private key of access structure Tk by
running
Randomly chooses r∈Zp , let σ idl ¼ gsð Þidl , then
calculates:
C0 ¼ e^ g;gð Þabrs;C1 ¼ e^ g;gð Þabs; C2




Then signer outputs v ¼ C1;C2;C3;M;σσ idl ;gs;H1 Mjjσσ idl
 sn o
and sends it to Adversary.
It can be seen that the simulator is consistent with our
scheme.
Phase 3:Challenge:
Adversary outputs a new signature vl with a challen-
ging access structure Tl and plaintext M.
Adversary cannot make Sign queries about Tl and vl is
not gained by a previous Sign query.
Adversary forges the signature as the following
process:
Chooses a polynomial plx.Sets plroot(0) = sl. Picks rl ∈
Zp, returns gsl to simulator.
Simulator chooses sends σσ idl ¼ gslð Þ
id back to
Adversary.
Adversary forges the private key Di;Tl ;σ idl






 0ð Þplx 0ð Þ
ti ¼ g
qx
 0ð Þplx 0ð Þ
ri ; if att xð Þ∈γ
g
qx
 0ð Þplx 0ð Þ
ti ¼ g
qx
 0ð Þplx 0ð Þ




Adversary calculates vl ¼ C0;C1;C2;M;gsl ;σσ idl ;H1 Mjjσσ idl
 sln o
:
C0 ¼ e^ g;gð Þabsl ;C1 ¼ e^ g;gð Þab:rlsl
C2 ¼ Di;Tl ;σ idl










rlþH1 Mjjσ idlð Þsl
;if att xð Þ∈γ
g
qx






rlþH1 Mjjσ idlð Þsl





Simulator firstly calculates VerityNode x;PK ;vlð Þ ¼ e^
gri ;C2ð Þ.
VerityNode x;PK ;vlð Þ
¼
(
e^ gri ; g
qx






rlþH1 Mjjσ idlð Þsl0BB@
1
CCA;
if att xð Þ∈γ
e^ gbβi ; g
qx











if att xð Þ∉γ
¼ e^ gplx 0ð Þ;gqx 0ð Þ rlþH1 Mjjσ idlð Þsl
ð10Þ
By recalling the recursive function, the value of root
node Froot can be calculated by:
Froot ¼ e^ gplroot 0ð Þ;gqroot 0ð Þ
 rlþH1 Mjjσ idlð Þsl
¼ e^ gsl ;gqroot 0ð Þ rlþH1 Mjjσ idlð Þsl
¼ e^ g;gð Þslqroot 0ð Þ
 rlþH1 Mjjσ idlð Þsl ð11Þ
According to the setting in Setup phase, let sl = c, rl þ H1
Mjjσ idlð Þsl ¼ f ; then
Froot ¼ e^ g;gð Þsl⋅qroot
 0ð Þ
 rlþH1 Mjjσ idlð Þsl
¼ e^ g;gð Þ
abc
 f
;if μ ¼ 0




Then we will discuss the advantage of simulator in
breaking the DBDH assumption.
When μ = 0, Adversary forges the signature success-
fully. According to our assumption, the probability of
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this incident is 12 þ ε. When Adversary successfully forges
the signature, simulator guesses u* = 0 and simulator has
a 12 þ ε probability of making the correct guess of u*.
The probability of simulator making the correct judg-
ment can be denoted by:
Pr u ¼ ujμ ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 1
2
þ ε ð13Þ
When μ = 1, Adversary fails to forge the signature. The
result of output is rejected symbol ⊥. Under this condition
simulator guesses μ* randomly. The probability of simulator
making the correct judgment can be denoted by:
Pr u ¼ ujμ ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 1
2
ð14Þ
As is mentioned above, the advantage of simulator is:
1
2
Pr u ¼ ujμ ¼ 0ð Þ þ 1
2


















Unforgeability with untrusted authorities and traceability
In attribute based signature mechanism, users’ attribute
private keys are generated and distributed by AA. Under
this circumstance, AA is capable of forging any signa-
tures without being detected. To keep the whole system
running safely, AA must be honest and highly protected
from being invaded. However, in the complex network
systems, there are variety risks which may result in the
fault of AA. Consequently, for the sake of safety, AA’s
rights in the system should be reduced to some extent.
In our KP-ABS-UT, the private key used for signature is
generated by joint efforts of both AA and user, so it is
computational infeasible for AA to forge any signatures
which should be signed by legal users. Besides, since dif-
ferent users randomly choose different secret numbers
to embed into their initial private keys distributed from
AA, it is computational infeasible for a user to personate
any other users to forge a legal signature in the system.
Anonymity is another important feature of common
attribute based signature mechanism. However, some mali-
cious users may take advantage of this feature to send out
illegal information without taking responsibility. To prevent
such incidents happening, in our KP-ABS-UT scheme, the
signer’s identity can be revealed with the introducing of
“tracer”. When data receivers receive illegal information
from a malicious signer, they can send the signature v to
tracer. Since tracer has stored σ idl ¼ gsð Þidl with user’s
identity, the signer’s identity can be located by searching
the idl−σ idl list. Then tracer calculates σ idl
−idl ¼
gsð Þidl
 −idl ¼ gs . Since s is the secret number used in the
Sign algorithm and gs has been sent to tracer, a signer can-
not deny the message he signed before.
Efficiency and comparison analysis
In our KP-ABS-UT scheme, assume “n” to be the amount
of attributes which a signer owns. The Sign algorithm
needs (n + 3) times of exponential operation and 1 hash
operation. The computation of Sign algorithm is low since
it does not need any paring operation. The Verify algo-
rithm needs (n + 1) times of paring operation and 1 hash
operation. Since the computation cost of paring operation
is much more than any other operation, in this paper, we
mainly compare the number of paring operation with
other ABS schemes [9, 14, 18] with respect to efficiency.
The efficiency and performance comparison results are
listed below in Table 2.
From the result we can see that the computation cost is
lower in our KP-ABS-UT since the number of bilinear
paring operation is reduced. Thus our plan has a higher
efficiency. Besides, our KP-ABS-UT uses access tree as
control structure, each signer’s private key corresponds a
certain structure. It is computational infeasible for differ-
ent users to collude their private keys with each other to
forge a legal signature. With the introducing of user’s se-
cret key component and the entity “tracer”, the signature
cannot be forged by AA and can be traced to identity if a
malicious user releases information illegally. The overall
comparison shows our KP-ABS-UT is of better perform-
ance and is more appropriate for secure data verification
in open network systems such as cloud computing, etc.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a KP-ABS with untrusted au-
thorities and traceability, which is also of high efficiency.
In our scheme, the signer’s private key is composed by
two components: one part is distributed by attribute au-
thority and the other part is chosen privately by the
signer’s self. The signature cannot be forged by any other
users including attribute authority. What’s more, the
identity of signer can be traced. Our scheme is proved to
be secure and of better performance with respect to
efficiency.







[14] LSSS Yes No (n + 3) paring
[9] Threshold No No 4 paring
[18] Threshold No No (n + 4) paring
Our
scheme
Access tree Yes Yes (n + 1) paring
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Our future work should focus on the attribute revoca-
tion and key refreshing in our KP-ABS scheme. Once
key exposure happens, although the system can trace the
traitor, however, user’s private keys still need to be
refreshed for the safe of privacy. Consequently, research
on the attribute based refreshing mechanisms should be
taken into our future research direction. Besides, out-
sourcing ABS [9] with untrusted attribute authorities
also merits attention.
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